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https://github.com/QuilibriumNetwork/ceremonyclient.git
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c797d482f9
* wip: conversion of hotstuff from flow into Q-oriented model * bulk of tests * remaining non-integration tests * add integration test, adjust log interface, small tweaks * further adjustments, restore full pacemaker shape * add component lifecycle management+supervisor * further refinements * resolve timeout hanging * mostly finalized state for consensus * bulk of engine swap out * lifecycle-ify most types * wiring nearly complete, missing needed hooks for proposals * plugged in, vetting message validation paths * global consensus, plugged in and verified * app shard now wired in too * do not decode empty keys.yml (#456) * remove obsolete engine.maxFrames config parameter (#454) * default to Info log level unless debug is enabled (#453) * respect config's "logging" section params, remove obsolete single-file logging (#452) * Trivial code cleanup aiming to reduce Go compiler warnings (#451) * simplify range traversal * simplify channel read for single select case * delete rand.Seed() deprecated in Go 1.20 and no-op as of Go 1.24 * simplify range traversal * simplify channel read for single select case * remove redundant type from array * simplify range traversal * simplify channel read for single select case * RC slate * finalize 2.1.0.5 * Update comments in StrictMonotonicCounter Fix comment formatting and clarify description. --------- Co-authored-by: Black Swan <3999712+blacks1ne@users.noreply.github.com>
46 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
46 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
package consensus
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import "source.quilibrium.com/quilibrium/monorepo/consensus/models"
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// Verifier is the component responsible for the cryptographic integrity of
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// votes, proposals and QC's against the state they are signing.
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type Verifier[VoteT models.Unique] interface {
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// VerifyVote checks the cryptographic validity of a vote's `SigData` w.r.t.
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// the rank and stateID. It is the responsibility of the calling code to
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// ensure that `voter` is authorized to vote.
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// Return values:
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// * nil if `sigData` is cryptographically valid
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// * models.InvalidFormatError if the signature has an incompatible format.
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// * models.ErrInvalidSignature is the signature is invalid
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// * unexpected errors should be treated as symptoms of bugs or uncovered
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// edge cases in the logic (i.e. as fatal)
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VerifyVote(vote *VoteT) error
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// VerifyQC checks the cryptographic validity of a QC's `SigData` w.r.t. the
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// given rank and stateID. It is the responsibility of the calling code to
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// ensure that all `signers` are authorized, without duplicates.
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// Return values:
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// * nil if `sigData` is cryptographically valid
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// * models.InvalidFormatError if `sigData` has an incompatible format
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// * models.InsufficientSignaturesError if `signers is empty.
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// Depending on the order of checks in the higher-level logic this error
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// might be an indicator of a external byzantine input or an internal bug.
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// * models.ErrInvalidSignature if a signature is invalid
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// * unexpected errors should be treated as symptoms of bugs or uncovered
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// edge cases in the logic (i.e. as fatal)
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VerifyQuorumCertificate(quorumCertificate models.QuorumCertificate) error
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// VerifyTimeoutCertificate checks cryptographic validity of the TC's
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// `sigData` w.r.t. the given rank. It is the responsibility of the calling
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// code to ensure that all `signers` are authorized, without duplicates.
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// Return values:
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// * nil if `sigData` is cryptographically valid
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// * models.InsufficientSignaturesError if `signers is empty.
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// * models.InvalidFormatError if `signers`/`highQCRanks` have differing
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// lengths
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// * models.ErrInvalidSignature if a signature is invalid
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// * unexpected errors should be treated as symptoms of bugs or uncovered
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// edge cases in the logic (i.e. as fatal)
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VerifyTimeoutCertificate(timeoutCertificate models.TimeoutCertificate) error
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}
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